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INTRODUCTION
[U]nlike conventional contract analysis, application of
promissory estoppel as expressed in section 90 requires that the
issue of injustice be specifically addressed.1
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Promissory estoppel2 has evolved as a mechanism to enforce
non-bargained for, relied upon promises. It is considered a
secondary rule of enforceable promises and as a narrow and
limited substitute for consideration.3 Promissory estoppel is
categorized as a contract, tort, or equitable doctrine and
classified, accordingly, as promise-based, assent-based, reliancebased, or equity-based liability.4
The law requires that four elements be present in order to
invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel: First, there has to be
a clear, definite, and unambiguous promise; second, the promisor
must have had reason to expect reliance on the promise; third,
the promise must have induced such reliance and a consequent
detrimental change of position; and fourth, injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise.5
The fourth element, which will be referred to as the justice
element, is the subject matter of this Article.6 The first Part
explores the current case law and scholarship in this matter.
This Part concludes that justice is considered an insignificant
element of promissory estoppel in both contract literature and
court opinions, and it links this conclusion to the insignificant
role of promissory estoppel in contract law in general. The
second Part suggests that justice should play a more prominent
and meaningful role in promissory estoppel by adopting a theory
of distributive justice. Thus, justice requires not only balancing
between the promisee and the promisor, but also that social

1
Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1265 (1998).
2
Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does
induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be
limited as justice requires.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981); see also id. § 139; id. § 139 cmt.
a (“This Section is complementary to § 90 . . . .”).
3
Orit Gan, Promissory Estoppel: A Call for a More Inclusive Contract Law, 16 J.
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 47, 53 (2013).
4
Id. at 56; see also ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW 44
(1997); STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 233 (2004).
5
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 2.19, at 167 (3d ed.
2004); ERIC MILLS HOLMES, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 8.9, at 29 (Joseph M. Perillo
ed., rev. ed. 1996) [hereinafter HOLMES, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS].
6
For justice in contract law, see generally Peter A. Alces, On Discovering
Doctrine: “Justice” in Contract Agreement, 83 WASH. U.L.Q. 471 (2005).
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considerations and public policy—such as the power dynamics
between the parties, their relations, and the allocative
implications—should be taken into account. Accordingly, courts
should actively promote justice in the formation of contract
process rather than minimally preventing injustice by enforcing
the promise. This is not only a change in the application of
promissory estoppel; a robust justice element will also lead to
making promissory estoppel a more meaningful doctrine of
contract formation.
Consider Dickens v. Equifax Services Inc.7 as an example.
An employee was made an offer to relocate from Phoenix to
Denver.8 His supervisor promised that he would be promoted if
he moved, that he would be a manager, that he would receive
annual pay increases and annual bonuses, that the amount of his
bonus would compensate for the loss of his wife’s income, and
that he would continue to have a career with the company until
age sixty-five.9 In reliance on this promise, the employee gave up
his job in Phoenix and sold his home.10 His wife quit her job, and
they moved to Denver.11 Subsequently, he was terminated on his
fifty-fifth birthday.12
The court dismissed his promissory
estoppel claim, concluding that the supervisor’s statements were
not sufficiently definite to be legally enforceable promises for
purposes of establishing promissory estoppel.13 These statements
were little more than vague assurances or unsupported
predictions, and thus the employee’s reliance on these statements
was unreasonable.14
The court did not consider whether
enforcing the promise was warranted to prevent injustice.
This decision is problematic since it does not protect
employees and it allows employers to benefit from an employee’s
change of position, which is based on the employer’s promise, and
later deny the promise.15 In contrast, this Article concludes that
such promises should be enforced. This Article proposes that the

7

No. 95-1217, 1996 WL 192973 (10th Cir. Apr. 22, 1996).
Id. at *1.
9
Id. at *1, *5.
10
Id. at *1.
11
Id. at *5.
12
Id. at *1.
13
Id. at *6.
14
Id.
15
Robert A. Hillman, The Unfulfilled Promise of Promissory Estoppel in the
Employment Setting, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 27 (1999).
8
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court should have considered the power imbalance between the
parties and the long-term employment.16 The court should have
taken into account not only the employer’s promise and the
employee’s reliance, but also their relations and the power
dynamics between the parties. The court should have used the
justice element to promote justice by accepting the employee’s
promissory estoppel claim. Rather than maintaining the power
relations between employees and employers, the courts should
police misuse of power and actively promote more egalitarian
employment relations. This will not only empower the employees
vis-a-vis the employers, but it will also enable employees to
enforce the promises made to them.17 Thus, employees will be
able to rely on employers’ promises and to benefit from contracts.
The contribution of this Article is threefold. First, it
critiques the current case law for ignoring and neglecting the
justice element of promissory estoppel. This goes against the
specific wording of section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts and also against promissory estoppel’s rationale and
purpose. Contrary to this approach, this Article suggests a
robust justice element based on a theory of distributive justice.
Second, a more robust justice element will make the doctrine
of promissory estoppel more meaningful. This will result in
better protecting reliance, furthering trust and cooperation
among parties, empowering disadvantaged parties, and making
the formation of contract a more flexible and conscience process.
Furthermore, this author’s previous Article, Promissory Estoppel:
A Call for a More Inclusive Contract Law, advocated the
importance of promissory estoppel18 and stressed that this
doctrine serves to police power imbalances between parties.
More generally, it enables underprivileged promisees19 to enforce
promises and to benefit from contracts. Accordingly, it makes
contract law more inclusive by enforcing rather than excluding
these promises. This Article is a follow-up article dealing with
how this can work in practice, meaning how promissory estoppel
16
Mr. Dickens was employed by Equifax Services, Inc. for thirty-two years from
1960 until 1993. Dickens, 1996 WL 192973, at *1.
17
Dickens did not base his claim on breach of contract. Id.
18
Gan, supra note 3, at 52.
19
I use the term underprivileged to mean parties lacking in bargaining power,
which are often times poor or minority people but not necessarily. For example,
employees usually have less bargaining power than employers though the employees
may be white, educated, and middle class.
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should become a more meaningful doctrine. This Article suggests
that a robust justice element will make promissory estoppel a
more significant doctrine of contract formation.
Third, this Article suggests a novel rationale for applying
distributive justice in contract law. While many scholars negate
the arguments against such application, this Article offers a
different
approach
to
supporting
distributive
justice
consideration under a contract law doctrine. In her previous
article, this author shows how promissory estoppel has a
disparate impact on different social groups.20 That article argues
that promissory estoppel is mainly used by underprivileged
promisees, such as employees. Since these promisees cannot
satisfy the consideration requirement, they cannot claim breach
of contract; as such, promissory estoppel is their only way to
enforce the promises made to them. Building on this groupsbased analysis, this Article argues that promissory estoppel
should apply distributive justice considerations.
Because
promissory estoppel is applied differently by different social
groups, this doctrine should address these allocative
consequences.
I.

JUSTICE—AN INSIGNIFICANT ELEMENT OF PROMISSORY
ESTOPPEL

This Part briefly outlines promissory estoppel case law and
scholarship on the matter of the justice element. It explores the
following questions: What does avoiding injustice “only by
enforcment of the promise” mean? How do courts interpret this?
What theories of justice do they use? What is the relation
between the justice element and the other three elements of the
promissory estoppel doctrine? This Part establishes that justice
is an insignificant, sometimes even ignored, element of
promissory estoppel. This conclusion is related to a more general
phenomenon, which is that promissory estoppel is considered an
insignificant doctrine of contract formation.

20

Gan, supra note 3, at 102.
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Avoiding Injustice

Although this Article uses the term “the justice element,”
according to section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
the aim of promissory estoppel is to avoid injustice. The wording
of section 90 seems to minimize the function of the promissory
estoppel doctrine. First, enforcing promises under this doctrine
should be used only as a last resort. The court will enforce a
promise only to avoid injustice; however, if the court can achieve
this goal by another means or if no injustice is expected, then the
promise should not be enforced. Second, the court is not required
to actively promote justice in contract formation, but rather to
minimally avoid injustice.21 Rather than affirmatively and
effectively pursuing justice, the courts make do with only
preventing injustice. Thus, section 90 inserts only a limited
notion of equity and justice into the contracting process.
B.

An Ignored Element

The justice element of promissory estoppel has received little
attention by judges.22 While focusing mainly on the promise
made by the promisor and on the reliance by the promisee, many
opinions neglect the justice element of this doctrine.23 As a
recent empirical study of promissory estoppel cases concluded,
“[M]ost judges require the existence of both promise and reliance
before allowing a promissory estoppel claim to proceed, although
surprisingly few judges speak in terms of ‘equity’ or ‘justice.’ ”24
For example, one opinion states:

21
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 1992) (“It is perhaps
worth noting that the test is not whether the promise should be enforced to do
justice, but whether enforcement is required to prevent an injustice. As has been
observed elsewhere, it is easier to recognize an unjust result than a just one,
particularly in a morally ambiguous situation.”).
22
FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 2.19, at 180 (“This vague qualification has been
discussed in relatively few cases.”); see JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON
CONTRACTS 312 (5th ed. 2011) (“There is very little discussion of this requirement in
the case law.”).
23
ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 220 (3d ed.
2002) (“In most cases, courts ignore this third element in promissory estoppel and
focus instead on whether a clear and definite promise was made and whether the
promisee reasonable [sic] relied on the promise.”).
24
Marco J. Jimenez, The Many Faces of Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical
Analysis Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 UCLA L. REV. 669, 672
(2010). For a discussion on these findings, see id. at 702–04.
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The doctrine of promissory estoppel which will create a cause of
action has two fundamental elements which must be proved by
the plaintiff. First, there must be proof that there actually was
a promise and, second, that the plaintiff relied upon that
promise and took action to his detriment.25

This court completely ignored the justice element and reduced
the doctrine of promissory estoppel to two elements.26
Some judges stress that promissory estoppel is an equitable
doctrine that gives the courts discretion in its application.27
However, they do not further discuss how this discretion should
be exercised and what theory of justice should be applied. Other
judges contend that when the promise and reliance prongs are
25
Haveg Corp. v. Guyer, 226 A.2d 231, 236–37 (Del. 1967); see also Metro.
Convoy Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 208 A.2d 519, 521 (Del. 1965); Martin-Senour Paints
v. Delmarva Venture Corp., No. CIV.A. 86C-JA11, 1988 WL 25376, at *2 (Del.
Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 1988).
26
See Cha Plake Holdings, Ltd. v. Chrysler Corp., No. 94C-04-164-JOH, 2002
Del. Super. LEXIS 31, at *133–37 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, Chrysler Corp. v. Chaplake Holdings, Ltd., 822 A.2d 1024 (Del. 2003). The
court’s instructions to the jury included this element of promissory estoppel:
“Plaintiffs were injured by acting or refraining from acting in reliance upon
Chrysler’s promises.” Id. at 111. Chrysler argued that the court should have
included an additional element according to which “the promise is binding because
injustice can only be avoided by its enforcement.” Id. at 134. The court rejected this
argument, holding:
First, this proffered additional element is not part of an action at law for
promissory estoppel. Second, in a dispute not involving an employment
situation, the element of preventing injustice is not one that need be
proven. . . . What the Supreme Court said in Quimby is not that avoiding
injustice is an element to be proven but is the policy underpinning for the
cause of action for promissory estoppel. For these reasons, the Court did
not err by not including this manifest injustice element in its instructions.
But, the facts of this case are a good example of the policy behind the cause
of action.
Id. at 134, 136–37; see Chrysler Corp., 822 A.2d at 1034 (“The prevention of injustice
is the ‘fundamental idea’ underlying the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
Accordingly, the trial judge implicitly found that this element was satisfied, and the
court did not err by failing to submit this element of the Lord test to the jury.”
(citation omitted)).
27
See, e.g., US Ecology, Inc. v. State, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 894, 901–02 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005); Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 663 N.W.2d 715, 729–30 (Wis. 2003)
(“When making a policy decision under the third element of the promissory estoppel
test—that is, determining whether an injustice can be avoided by enforcing the
promise—a court ‘must remember all of its powers, derived from equity, law
merchant, and other sources, as well as the common law. Its decree should be
molded accordingly.’ . . . Permitting the plaintiffs to obtain damages from an
immune public official through the back door opened by a claim of promissory
estoppel contravenes the government immunity policy of this State set forth . . . and
consequently would not serve the ends of justice.”).
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met, then the justice prong is also satisfied.28 Thus, the justice
element is redundant and is established by a showing of
detrimental reliance on a clear and unambiguous promise.
Contrary to the specific language of section 90 that requires
courts to examine whether enforcement is warranted to prevent
injustice, courts rarely consider justice in their holdings.
Scholarly literature has similarly only rarely addressed the
justice prong of promissory estoppel. Some scholars categorize
promissory estoppel as a promise-based or assent-based liability,
while others categorize promissory estoppel as reliance-based
liability.29 Consequently, in spite of this difference of opinion,
both schools of thought tend to focus mainly on the promise and
on the reliance elements of the doctrine, respectively.30
Furthermore, even scholars who categorize promissory estoppel
as an equitable doctrine do not give a full and adequate analysis
of justice.31 They give only a general theoretical notion of the
doctrine’s equitable character. For example, Holmes uses terms
like good faith, conscience, honesty, and equity rather than
justice to stress the equitable nature of promissory estoppel.32
According to Holmes:

28
MURRAY, supra note 22 (“The requirement appears conclusory once it is
shown that a party justifiably relied on a promise and the promisor reasonably
expected such reliance.”); see also Heffron v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., No. A112039, 2012 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 741, at *18 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2012)
(“[T]he district court’s findings that appellant made a clear and definite promise and
that respondents’ reliance was reasonable are not clearly erroneous. We conclude
that these findings support the district court’s conclusion that the promise must be
enforced to prevent injustice.”); Chester Creek Techs., Inc. v. Kessler, No. A06-505,
2007 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6, at *14 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2007) (“Taking as
true the jury’s determinations that Chester Creek made a clear and definite
promise; that Chester Creek intended for Kessler to rely on it; and that Kessler did
in fact rely on it, we conclude that the district court did not err when it concluded
that enforcement of the promise was necessary to prevent injustice.”); Baldwin v.
Aurora Health Care, Inc., No. 00-1006, 2001 WI App 75, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 28,
2001) (“Baldwin’s termination of her practice was reasonable in light of the jury’s
finding that a promise was made and Baldwin reasonably relied on it. It was
reasonably foreseeable by Aurora that Baldwin would terminate her practice given
her clear expression of interest in leaving direct patient care in favor of ADCP work,
which the jury found Aurora offered. The injustice factors of U.S. Oil are satisfied in
this case.”).
29
See, e.g., Gan, supra note 3, at 56.
30
Id. at 56, 60.
31
Id. at 62.
32
Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 263, 515–16 (1996).
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With its equitable underpinnings—good faith, conscience,
honesty, and equity—promissory estoppel recognizes the
promisee’s right to reasonably rely, arising from the reasonable
expectations created and foreseeable by the promisor. The
promisor’s statements and manifestations must objectively
evidence a sufficient commitment or assurance on which a
reasonable person foreseeably would rely. In such a case, the
promisor has a duty to prevent a promisee’s detrimental
reliance.
The remedy for breach is discretionary and
personalized, predicated on the principles and standards of good
faith, conscience, honesty, and equity. A promisee or third
party recovering under promissory estoppel should neither be
penalized nor experience a windfall.33

Similarly, Charles Knapp observes:
Section 90 also contains a requirement that the situation be
such that “injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise.” From the wording of the section, it appears that the
reference to injustice is not simply a verbal summation of all the
elements that have been listed so far. Rather it is an additional
element, distinct from the others. Even if a promise has
induced foreseeable, substantial and reasonable reliance,
meeting all the specific tests imposed by section 90, the final
question must still be answered. Will injustice result from its
nonenforcement? To the drafters of section 90, this is an open
question—the answer will often be yes, but it can be no.34

Thus, though Knapp and other scholars acknowledge that
justice is an independent element of promissory estoppel, they
fall short of specifying what justice means and what theory of
justice should be applied under section 90.
C.

Corrective Justice

The few court opinions that have discussed the justice
element of promissory estoppel have concluded that justice
means corrective justice.35 In contrast to distributive justice,36
33

Id.
Knapp, supra note 1, at 1264 (footnote omitted); see also HOLMES, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS, supra note 5, § 8.9, at 33.
35
Holmes, supra note 32, at 276 (“Presently, reliance consideration has its own
autonomous sphere of influence as an evolving equitable principle for enforcing the
right to rely on certain promises and for designing relief to afford corrective justice
between parties.” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 307–08 (Alaska), at 315
(Arizona), at 318 (Arkansas), at 322, 327, 331, 339 (California), at 343 (Colorado), at
353 (Delaware), at 363 (Florida), at 413 (New Jersey), at 425 (New York), at 433
34
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corrective justice deals only with balancing between the promisor
and the promisee37 and it ignores social aspects of the contract
and policy considerations.38 Under a corrective justice approach,
one party has to compensate the other for the damage she
caused.39 Put differently, the promisor was unjustly enriched as
a result of the promisee’s reliance. In applying this notion of
justice, these judges mainly weigh the loss caused to the
promisee due to her reliance on the promise but also the
promisor’s situation.40
For example, one court explained:

(North Carolina), at 446 (Pennsylvania), at 464 (Texas). James Gordley asserts that
cases applying the consideration and promissory estoppel doctrines can be explained
by “Aristotelian ideas of commutative justice and liberality.” Accordingly, Gordley
states:
[Courts’] decisions do not turn on whether the parties made a bargain or
the promisee relied or the offeree assented. They turn on the effect of the
transaction on the distribution of wealth between the parties. Promises
that enrich the promisee at the promisor’s expense are not enforced, unless
the promisor intended to enrich him and there is some reason to think the
promisor’s decision is sensible and will change the distribution of wealth for
the better.
James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 547, 548 (1995).
36
Distributive justice is discussed further in Part II.C.
37
Carolyn Edwards, Promissory Estoppel and the Avoidance of Injustice, 12
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 223, 248–49 (1987) (“Without a doubt, the success which the
doctrine of promissory estoppel has enjoyed in the last two decades has provided the
foundation and the encouragement for the development of new rules which are
designed to achieve fairness between parties to a bargain contract.”); see also TransWorld Int’l, Inc. v. Smith-Hemion Prods., 972 F. Supp. 1275, 1288 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(considering the behaviors of both parties).
38
For corrective justice in contract law, see, for example, Eyal Zamir, The
Missing Interest: Restoration of the Contractual Equivalence, 93 VA. L. REV. 59, 108–
112 (2007). For distributive justice, see, for example, id. at 112–16; see also Peter
Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77
IOWA L. REV. 515, 535–47 (1992); Curtis Bridgeman, Note, Corrective Justice in
Contract Law: Is There a Case for Punitive Damages?, 56 VAND. L. REV. 237, 252–60
(2003); Menachem Mautner, “The Eternal Triangles of the Law”: Toward a Theory of
Priorities in Conflicts Involving Remote Parties, 90 MICH. L. REV. 95, 103–06 (1991).
39
See Zamir, supra note 38, at 108.
40
Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Reliance
on Illusory Promises, 44 SW. L.J. 841, 849 (1990) (“Although the main focus of this
open-ended requirement appears to be the harm the promisee would suffer in the
event of nonenforcement, consideration of the promisor’s position is implicitly part of
the process of determining the nature of his promise and the substantiality of the
reliance it produced.”); see also Snyder v. Snyder, 558 A.2d 412, 417 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1989) (“One of the most significant factors in determining whether justice
demands enforcement of the promise is whether the promisor acted
unconscionably.”), cert. denied, 564 A.2d 1182 (1989).
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Defendant’s fifth ‘essential element of estoppel’ refers to a
‘weighing of all the equities.’
If by that is meant a
mathematical comparison of potential disadvantages to the
respective parties depending on whether the promise is or is not
enforced, the proposition is unsound. The question is not which
party will suffer the greater detriment if the contention of the
other prevails. That is not the rule of promissory estoppel—
estoppel that arises when an innocent promisee relies, to his
disadvantage, upon a promise intended or reasonably calculated
to induce action by him. In such case equity is first concerned
with the plight of the innocent promisee if the promisor be
permitted to seek asylum within the protection of the statute of
frauds. . . . Vander Wal attempted to measure any threatened
damage to plaintiffs’ home at ‘from fifty to seventy-five per cent
of its present value.’ But we agree with him ‘the damage cannot
be evaluated in dollars and cents.’ That fact merely fortifies the
jurisdiction of equity to restrain this threatened wrong. An
injury is said to be irreparable where there exists no certain
pecuniary standad [sic] for measuring the damage. We think
the record shows that here, in the language of the Restatement,
‘injustice can be avoided only by enforcement’ of the promise
upon which plaintiffs relied. While the threatened injustice to
the promisee is equity’s first consideration, it is proper to
consider the possible harshness to defendant by enforcement of
his promise.41

In order to have the promise enforced, the promisee has to
convince the court that enforcing the promise would prevent her
unjust injury. Accordingly:
The authorities are not in accord on the precise meaning of the
injustice requirement. Some courts have ruled that it is
sufficient that the reliance be detrimental in the consideration
sense; others have insisted that the reliance be injurious to the
promisee. Logically, injury is required; without injury there
would be no injustice in not enforcing the promise. As Judge
Posner has indicated, the doctrine requires that the promisee
incur a real cost.42
41

Miller v. Lawlor, 66 N.W.2d 267, 274 (Iowa 1954) (citations omitted).
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 221 (6th ed.
2009) (footnotes omitted); see also Burton v. GMC, No. 1:95-cv-1054-DFH-TAB, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62758, at *39 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 15, 2008) (The court’s instructions to
the jury regarding the elements of promissory estoppel included the following: “that
the plaintiff suffered a financial loss because General Motors broke the promise, and
an award of damages for breaking the promise is needed to avoid what would
otherwise be an injustice.”); Indus. Maxifreight Servs., LLC v. Tenneco Auto.
42
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If, however, no such loss or injury can be shown, the
promissory estoppel claim is rejected.43 For example, in one case,

Operating Co., 182 F. Supp. 2d 630, 636 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (“Michigan courts apply
the doctrine of promissory estoppel cautiously, and only where the facts are
unquestionable and the wrong to be prevented undoubted.”); Kattke v. Indep. Order
of Foresters, No. 00-276 ADM/AJB, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23232, at *13 (D. Minn.
May 22, 2001), aff’d, 30 F. App’x. 660 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Especially where the promise
alleged is ‘at-will’ employment, there must be some tangible detriment for a finding
of injustice.”); Hoffmann v. Boone, 708 F. Supp. 78, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that
the party asserting promissory estoppel as a defense to the statute of frauds must
demonstrate unconscionable injury); Laks v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 131 Cal.
Rptr. 836, 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are
“(1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom
the promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and
(4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.”); Kiely v. St.
Germain, 670 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo. 1983) (“The doctrine of promissory estoppel
encourages fair dealing in business relationships and discourages conduct which
unreasonably causes foreseeable economic loss because of action or inaction induced
by a specific promise.”); CBA Collection Servs. v. Potter, No. 95A-10-023-RRC, 1996
Del. Super. LEXIS 357, at *17 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 1996) (“Promissory estoppel
which creates a cause of action requires 1) a promise, 2) reliance on that promise,
and 3) injury to the party relying on that promise.”); Conrad v. Fields, No. A06-1387,
2007 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 744, at *14 (Minn. Ct. App. July 24, 2007)
(“Appellant argues that because respondent received a valuable law degree, she did
not suffer any real detriment by relying on his promise. But receiving a law degree
was the expected and intended consequence of appellant’s promise, and the essence
of appellant’s promise was that respondent would receive the law degree without the
debt associated with attending law school. Although respondent benefited from
attending law school, the debt that she incurred in reliance on appellant’s promise is
a detriment to her.”); Geisinger v. A & B Farms, Inc., 820 S.W.2d 96, 100 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1991) (“Without injury there is no injustice by not enforcing the promise.”);
Hellenbrand v. Goodman, 2003 WI App 162, at *38 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (“Although
none of the elements of promissory estoppel expressly require that the broken
promise be a cause of harm to the plaintiff, such a requirement is plainly a part of
the ‘avoidance of injustice’ inquiry encompassed by the third element.”).
43
See, e.g., Local 107 Office & Prof’l Emps. Int’l Union v. Offshore Logistics,
Inc., 380 F.3d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (“In this case, the Union did not
suffer any harm as a result of Offshore’s failure to implement the 2002 pay
increases.”); Brock & Co. v. Kings Row Assocs., No. 04-cv-2096, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26340, at *9 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (rejecting promissory estoppel claim because
promisee benefitted from the relationship with promisor); State v. First Nat’l Bank
of Ketchikan, 629 P.2d 78, 81 (Alaska 1981) (“Even taken in the light most favorable
to the Bank, the evidence introduced at trial leads us to the conclusion that
enforcement of the State’s promise is not necessary in the interest of justice. Under
the circumstances, we must agree with the State’s claim that the real cause of the
Bank’s loss was its misplaced reliance on Jones, not the materiality of the State’s
promise to the Bank. It is undisputed that had Jones proven to be the trustworthy
businessman that the Bank believed he was, the State’s failure to perform its
promise would have resulted in nothing more than a two-week delay in the closing of
its loan to Jones. And it is clear that, as Taylor conceded, a two-week delay was ‘no
big concern.’ Since we are convinced that the Bank’s loss was caused by its own
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though both the promise element and the reliance element of
promissory estoppel were satisfied, the court concluded:
In generic terms, the promise to appellant was one that a
benefit would probably be given and that it would probably be
given to appellant. We can find no precedent for application of
the doctrine of promissory estoppel to enforce a promise with
benefits as uncertain as these, and we conclude that this is not
the kind of commitment calling for special judicial action in the
name of avoiding injustice.44

The Restatement’s comments also take the view that, under
the justice prong, the court should consider the detriment and
the promisee’s loss, the promisee’s reliance and the unjust
enrichment of the promisor, and the promisor’s promise.45 The
comment provides:
The promisor is affected only by reliance which he does or
should foresee, and enforcement must be necessary to avoid
injustice. Satisfaction of the latter requirement may depend on
the reasonableness of the promisee’s reliance, on its definite and
substantial character in relation to the remedy sought, on the
formality with which the promise is made, on the extent to
which the evidentiary, cautionary, deterrent and channeling
functions of form are met by the commercial setting or
otherwise, and on the extent to which such other policies as the
enforcement of bargains and the prevention of unjust
enrichment are relevant.46

erroneous judgment as to Jones’s character rather than by its reliance on the State’s
promise, we do not believe that justice would be served by requiring the State to
bear the loss occasioned when Jones absconded with $30,000 on loan from the
Bank.”); Kiley v. First Nat’l Bank, 649 A.2d 1145, 1154 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994)
(“Given that the Kileys had the benefit of the BFF terms for some five years, justice
certainly does not compel application of promissory estoppel.”); Filippi v. Filippi, 818
A.2d 608, 627 (R.I. 2003) (“[S]he suffered no detriment. . . . Under these
circumstances we refuse to find such detriment that justice requires enforcement of
the alleged contract.”); Barnes & Robinson Co. v. Onesource Facility Servs., 195
S.W.3d 637, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (“No injustice arises in the refusal to enforce
a promise where either the loss induced is negligible or the promisee’s reliance is not
reasonable.”).
44
Faimon v. Winona State Univ., 540 N.W.2d 879, 884 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995);
see also In re Babcock & Wilcox Co., Nos. 00-10992, 00-10993, 00-10995, Civ.A.020335, 2002 WL 1874836, at *6 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2002); Worlds v. Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp., No. 90-C-0643, 1990 WL 129346, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 1990).
45
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b (1981).
46
Id.
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Though the Restatement opens the door for policy
considerations under the justice requirement, such as the
enforcement of bargains and prevention of unjust enrichment, it
stops short of introducing distribution aspects and other social
issues into the equation.47 Thus, promissory estoppel aims to
provide a remedy to the promisee for her loss or to have the
promisor pay the promisee due to the promisor’s wrongful
enrichment.48 The only consideration under the justice analysis
is the parties’ respective situations and conduct, but other
societal and distributive considerations are beyond the scope of
this doctrine.49 This approach is not neutral; rather, it has
distributive results—it maintains rather than mitigates power
dynamics between the parties.
In other words, by not
intervening, it favors the dominant party.
D. The Remedy
Justice is not only an element of promissory estoppel; it also
applies to the remedy.50 According to section 90 of Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, “[t]he remedy granted for breach may be
limited as justice requires.”51 The First Restatement did not
47
See id. § 139(2) (“In determining whether injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise, the following circumstances are significant: (a) the
availability and adequacy of other remedies, particularly cancellation and
restitution; (b) the definite and substantial character of the action or forbearance in
relation to the remedy sought; (c) the extent to which the action or forbearance
corroborates evidence of the making and terms of the promise, or the making and
terms are otherwise established by clear and convincing evidence; (d) the
reasonableness of the action or forbearance; (e) the extent to which the action or
forbearance was foreseeable by the promisor.”); see also id. § 139 cmt. b (“Like § 90
this Section states a flexible principle, but the requirement of consideration is more
easily displaced than the requirement of a writing. The reliance must be foreseeable
by the promisor, and enforcement must be necessary to avoid injustice. Subsection
(2) lists some of the relevant factors in applying the latter requirement. Each factor
relates either to the extent to which reliance furnishes a compelling substantive
basis for relief in addition to the expectations created by the promise or to the extent
to which the circumstances satisfy the evidentiary purpose of the Statute and fulfill
any cautionary, deterrent and channeling functions it may serve.”).
48
See, e.g., Faimon, 540 N.W.2d at 883 (“Numerous considerations enter into a
judicial determination of injustice, including the reasonableness of a promisee’s
reliance and a weighing of public policies in favor of both enforcing bargains and
preventing unjust enrichment.”); see also Panasonic Commc’ns & Sys. v. State Dep’t
of Admin., Bureau of Purchases, 691 A.2d 190, 196 (Me. 1997).
49
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b.
50
See id. § 90.
51
Id. For the causation element, see US Ecology, Inc. v. State, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d
894, 896 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (“[A]s in ordinary contract actions, a plaintiff seeking
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include this part, which was added in the Second Restatement.52
This language gives courts discretion to tailor the damages to the
specific circumstances in order to achieve a just remedy.53 But in
practice, courts apply their discretion in a limited manner. Court
opinions and scholars have interpreted this provision to mean
that the usual remedy is expectation damages, meaning full
contractual damages. However, in some cases, justice requires
that damages be limited to the reliance interest of the promisee.54
In other words, promissory estoppel generally awards
expectation damages similar to breach of contract damages, but
because of its equitable nature, it gives the courts discretion to
award reliance damages.
The Restatement’s comments provide that “relief may
sometimes be limited to restitution or to damages or specific
relief measured by the extent of the promisee’s reliance rather
than by the terms of the promise.”55 However, courts tend to

recovery on a promissory estoppel theory must prove that the defendant’s breach
was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s damages.”).
52
For limiting damages as justice requires, see generally W. F. Young, Half
Measures, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 19, 24–30 (1981).
53
Holmes, supra note 32, at 295–96 (“The remedy for promissory estoppel is
discretionary. No rigid or mechanical remedy rule applies. The remedy is not
necessarily co-extensive with damages for contract breach, but is equitably molded
ad hoc for each case according to the dictates of good faith, conscience, and justice.
With their reliance sabers, courts award the full range of remedies based on specific
performance, restitution, expectation, reliance, exemplary (seldom), or some other
appropriate relief to achieve corrective justice between the parties in the context of
their distinct litigation.” (footnotes omitted)); HOLMES, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS,
supra note 5, § 8.8, at 21 (“There is no reason why the courts of the present day
should not ‘make the remedy fit the crime’ and make the amount of a judgment for
damages depend upon the special circumstances and the merits of the claims of all
existing claimants.”); see also Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 276
(Wis. 1965) (“Where damages are awarded in promissory estoppel instead of
specifically enforcing the promisor’s promise, they should be only such as in the
opinion of the court are necessary to prevent injustice. Mechanical or rule of thumb
approaches to the damage problem should be avoided.”).
54
FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, at 180 (“Even if the requirements for
enforceability of a promise are met, the Restatement Second states that recovery
‘may be limited as justice requires,’ language that is generally invoked in limiting
recovery to damages based on the reliance interest.”); see also Baldwin v. Aurora
Health Care, Inc., No. 00-1006, 2001 WI App. 75, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2001)
(“The amount of damages ‘may be determined by the plaintiff's expenditures or
change of position in reliance as well as by the value to him of the promised
performance.’ ”).
55
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. d (1981).
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award either expectation damages or reliance damages,56 and
they generally do not award other remedies, such as specific
performance or restitution.57 For example, one court stated:
An equity court possesses some discretionary power to award
damages in order to do complete justice. Furthermore, since it
is the historic purpose of equity to secure complete justice, the
courts are able to adjust the remedies so as to grant the
necessary relief, and a district court sitting in equity may even
devise a remedy which extends or exceeds the terms of a prior
agreement between the parties, if it is necessary to make the
injured party whole. Since promissory estoppel is an equitable
matter, the trial court has broad power in its choice of a
remedy.58

The opinion then stated that the court has discretion to choose
from a broad range of remedies; however, it only debated
whether to award the lost profits or the expenditures in reliance
on the promise.59 It did not consider other remedies beyond
expectation damages or reliance damages.60
It is interesting to note that, with regard to the remedy, the
Restatement uses the term “justice” rather than injustice.61
Despite this linguistic difference, however, the courts use limited
discretion with regard to the remedy. Similarly, the courts give a
narrow interpretation to, and limitedly use, the doctrine’s justice
element, as demonstrated above.62

56
For expectation damages see, for example, Gan, supra note 3, at 59. For
reliance damages see, for example, Gan, supra note 3, at 61.
57
Walters v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 1098, 1100–01 (7th Cir. 1981).
58
Id. at 1100 (citations omitted); see also D & G Stout, Inc. v. Bacardi Imps.,
Inc., 923 F.2d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 1991) (debating whether to award expectation
damages or reliance damages); D & G Stout v. Bacardi Imports, 805 F. Supp. 1434,
1451 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (debating whether to award expectation damages or reliance
damages); Tynan v. JBVBB, LLC, 743 N.W.2d 730, 734–35 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007)
(debating whether to award expectation damages or reliance damages).
59
Walters, 642 F.2d at 1100–01.
60
See Burton v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 95-CV-1054, 2008 WL 3853329, at *19
(S.D. Ind. Aug. 15, 2008) (“There is no simple answer to the question of what type of
damages are appropriate as a remedy for promissory estoppel. The court concludes
that under federal common law, the court and/or the jury has the discretion to
fashion the remedy needed to avoid injustice based on a promissory estoppel claim,
which can include either expectation damages or reliance damages.”).
61
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (“The remedy granted for
breach may be limited as justice requires.”).
62
See Part I.B.
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Why Is Justice Unimportant?

Some contract law scholars have observed that the current
trend in contract law is toward a formalist, conservative contract
law similar to classical contract law.63 Reflecting this trend,
courts are moving away from a looser, open-textured approach
toward a more restrictive approach that emphasizes definitions,
categories, and bright-line rule formulations.64 In addition,
courts embrace a more formal, abstract, inflexible, and
rule-oriented application of contract law.65 Courts also rely
heavily on freedom of contract and embrace values such as
respect for market exchange and disapproval of state
intervention.66
This results in empowering economically
dominant parties rather than mitigating power imbalance
between the parties.
This trend explains why promissory estoppel is considered by
many scholars to be an insignificant doctrine of contract
formation.67 But this trend also explains why the justice prong is

63
JAY M. FEINMAN, UN-MAKING LAW: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO ROLL
BACK THE COMMON LAW 78–127 (2004). But see Daniela Caruso, Contract Law and
Distribution in the Age of Welfare Reform, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 665, 666–68 (2007);
Sidney W. DeLong, Placid, Clear-Seeming Words: Some Realism About the New
Formalism (with Particular Reference to Promissory Estoppel), 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
13, 17 (2001); Carolyn Edwards, Freedom of Contract and Fundamental Fairness for
Individual Parties: The Tug of War Continues, 77 UMKC L. REV. 647, 674–78 (2009).
64
Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L.
REV. 1131, 1133 (1995). See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Social Justice
Movements and LatCrit Community: On Making Anti-Essentialist and Social
Constructionist Arguments in Court, 81 OR. L. REV. 629, 643–44 (2002) (“[T]he
traditionally embraced view of an impartial judiciary carefully applying neutral
legal principles is itself mythic and illusory. The business of judging, even in the
most desiccated breach of contract case, always calls for decisions regarding a
party’s fit into a legally (i.e., socially) constructed category. In contract law, as in
anti-discrimination law, society has determined, and then expressed through legal
regulation, under what conditions an injured party deserves a remedy. Yet somehow
this judicial undertaking seems less fraught with difficulty in a contract dispute,
perhaps because although the rules related to relief are socially/legally constructed,
they do not seek to embody extant traits but instead shuffle people in and out of the
class entitled to recover for breach of contract according to specific criteria defined
by law (e.g., existence of a valid contract, breach, damages).” (footnote omitted)).
65
Robert A. Hillman, The “New Conservatism” in Contract Law and the Process
of Legal Change, 40 B.C. L. REV. 879, 879–80 (1999); see also Jay M. Feinman, UnMaking Law: The Classical Revival in the Common Law, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 2
(2004).
66
Mooney, supra note 64, at 1134 (“The most fundamental conception returning
to dominate contract law today is ‘freedom of contract.’ ”).
67
Gan, supra note 3, at 65.
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considered unimportant. Courts disfavor standards such as
justice and adhere to formal and strict contracting rules.68
Courts are also less inclined to use equitable doctrines to protect
underprivileged parties.69 As a result, courts interpret justice
narrowly and limit the application of promissory estoppel.70
II. JUSTICE—TOWARD A SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT OF PROMISSORY
ESTOPPEL
This Part discusses how courts should interpret and apply
the justice element of promissory estoppel. Contrary to the
current attitude toward this aspect, justice should be considered
a meaningful element and independent of the other elements of
promissory estoppel. In addition, courts should actively promote
justice in the contracting process by applying a theory of
distributive justice that goes beyond considerations of the
interests of the parties. In particular, courts should consider the
relations between the parties, the power imbalance between the
parties, the allocative aspects of the contract, and other public
policy considerations under the justice prong.
This Part
advocates for a change in the way the courts use justice in their
opinions. This will result in a profound change in the meaning,
application, and function of the promissory estoppel doctrine.
Furthermore, it will make promissory estoppel a more robust
doctrine, which can serve both to protect the reliance of
underprivileged parties and to empower underprivileged parties
by providing them with a tool to enforce the promises made to
them. This will make the contracting process more flexible,
egalitarian, and conscionable, and, more generally, it will make
contract law more inclusive and pluralist.

68
Id. (“[C]ourts move away from a looser, open-textured approach toward a
more restrictive approach emphasizing definitions, categories, and bright-line rule
formulations.” (citing Mooney, supra note 64, at 1133–34)).
69
Id. at 79–80 (“However, underprivileged promisees remain at a disadvantage,
since they often cannot adhere to contract law formalities and form legally binding
contracts.”).
70
See Part I.B.
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From Avoiding Injustice to Promoting Justice

For reasons that are elaborated below,71 this Article suggests
that the courts use the promissory estoppel doctrine as a means
to achieve justice in contract formation. Rather than serving the
limited role of avoiding injustice in special and extreme cases, the
promissory estoppel doctrine should aim to actively promote
justice in the contracting process. The doctrine of promissory
estoppel should be used to police misuses of power in
negotiations.72 In other words, by enforcing promises, the
promissory estoppel doctrine will correct power imbalances
between parties, and will empower the weaker party on the one
hand and prevent the stronger party from denying her promise
on the other. Promissory estoppel will prevent harmful behavior
by the dominant party to the detriment of the other party.
Accordingly, equitable values will make the formation of contract
more conscionable and egalitarian. Rather than adhering to the
formality of the doctrine of consideration, promissory estoppel
will enable the courts to counterbalance the rigidity of the
bargain theory. Then, promissory estoppel will be a meaningful
and viable alternative to consideration, with justice at its core.
This active role of the court is explained by the view that
power imbalances between parties or relations of trust may
disadvantage promisees who can only enforce the promises made
to them by using the doctrine of promissory estoppel.73 The
formal bargaining process places barriers to forming a contract in
the way of such promisees; thus, they can turn only to promissory
estoppel.
Consequently, the justice element of promissory
estoppel and its equitable nature are important parts of this
doctrine. Basing this doctrine only on promise and reliance while
ignoring the justice element not only empowers the already
powerful party, but also defies the equitable purpose of the
promissory estoppel doctrine. It enables the dominant party to
enjoy the benefits of her promise and then deny it, while

71

See infra Part II.C.
Juliet P. Kostritsky, A New Theory of Assent-Based Liability Emerging Under
the Guise of Promissory Estoppel: An Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REV.
895, 910 (1987); Hillman, supra note 15 (stating courts should use promissory
estoppel to protect employees).
73
Gan, supra note 3, at 85.
72
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simultaneously leaving the promisee to bear the loss caused by
her reliance on the promise. Rather than maintaining the status
quo, the justice element is a tool to redistribution.
A robust justice element is desirable from the
underprivileged parties’ point of view. However, protecting the
reliance interest and encouraging mutual trust and cooperation
between the parties will benefit all parties, including dominant
parties. Privileged parties might benefit from exploiting the
other party by gaining advantage from the latter’s behavior
based on the promise and later denying their promise. However,
this benefit is outweighed by the benefits of a regime of trust and
cooperation between the contracting parties.
One might argue that the concept of justice is too vague and
focusing on it might give courts too much discretion. Thus, a
more limited application of justice gives parties the benefit of
predictable and stable contract law. However, if the courts begin
to apply a distributive theory of justice, then, in time, a known
concept of justice will be developed on which parties can rely. In
addition, the courts have used, and have developed, other openended standards such as public policy, unconscionability, and
good faith. Thus, the courts are up to the task of developing a
workable and viable notion of justice under the promissory
estoppel doctrine.
One might also argue that according to the words of section
90, justice has a minor and limited role. In other words,
enforcement is restricted by justice considerations to extreme
cases where “injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise.”74 However, because of the equitable and important role
of promissory estoppel as indicated above, and further explored
below, the courts should give the justice element a more robust
role. The weight of the justice element will enable courts to
achieve the just solution and to include policy considerations in
the formation process.
Expanding, rather than limiting,
enforcement of promises using the justice element will serve good
causes, such as strengthening trust and reliance between the
parties and policing power imbalances in the bargaining process.

74

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
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Unconscionability doctrine, like promissory estoppel, deals
with power imbalances between parties;75 however, each doctrine
serves a different role. The former gives the court the discretion
not to enforce an unconscionable term or contract and
does not relate to enforcing promises. Although procedural
unconscionability76 looks at the negotiations and the formation
process, it does not enable the promisee to enforce a promise.
Accordingly, both promissory estoppel and unconscionability
protect the right of underprivileged parties to contract in
different ways. These doctrines have distinct rationales and
purposes. However, the two doctrines should coexist in harmony.
This harmony will be achieved by utilizing both doctrines to
police power imbalances between parties and by allowing both
doctrines to serve distributive justice goals. Thus, distributive
justice considerations should not be left to the doctrine of
unconscionability alone. Rather, both promissory estoppel and
unconscionability should be used by the court to police the
formation of contracts and to view this process through the eyes
of distributive justice theory.
B.

From an Ignored Element to an Independent Element

In contrast to the way justice is currently used, it is time for
the courts to stop ignoring the justice element of promissory
estoppel. Disregarding this element is not only contrary to the
wording of section 90,77 it also goes against the doctrine’s
equitable nature and goals.78 Rather, courts should examine the
justice element as a separate element and not make do with only
referring to the promise and reliance elements of promissory
estoppel.79 The justice requirement is an independent element of
this doctrine, supplementing the promise and the reliance
75
Id. § 208; U.C.C. § 2-302 (2012); see also Charles L. Knapp, Unconscionability
in American Contract Law: A Twenty-First Century Survey, in COMMERCIAL
CONTRACT LAW: TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES 309 (Larry A. DiMatteo, Qi Zhou,
Séverine Saintier & Keith Rowley eds., 2013).
76
See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 489–90 (1967).
77
Disregarding the justice element is also contrary to the view of Professor
Williston, the drafter of the Restatement. Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel:
Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 484 (1950).
78
See id.
79
Id. at 483–84 (supporting the view that justice is a separate element of
promissory estoppel and rejecting the view that justice is a guide to the application
of the promise and reliance elements of the doctrine).
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prongs. This independent and new meaning of justice will be
based on a theory of distributive justice that is further discussed
below. Thus, the justice element has a broader meaning than the
loss or harm to the promisee due to her detrimental reliance and
the unjust enrichment of the promisor.
As mentioned, promissory estoppel has three main
independent elements: the promise, the promisee’s reliance, and
justice, which includes avoiding injustice.80 The justice element
differs from the others in that it is a matter of law, while the
other two elements constitute questions of fact.81 Accordingly,
the jury determines the questions of fact, while the court
determines the questions of law and policy. The first two
elements should be weighed in inverse to the third element.
That is, the more clear, definite, and unambiguous the promise,
the less weight need be given to justice considerations. Similarly,
the more the reliance is detrimental to the promisee, the lighter
the burden of justice. And vice versa, if the two elements are
weak, then the justice needs to be very meaningful. If the
promise is not concrete enough and the reliance caused little or
no loss, then the promisee needs to show significant justice
considerations in order to enforce the promise. In other words,
courts should delicately balance these three elements. Even if
the promise is a little unclear or the reliance is not highly
detrimental, this is not the end of the court’s examination. The
court should not make do with concluding that the promise and
reliance elements are weak. Rather, the court should further
examine the justice element and only after balancing the relative
impact of all the doctrine’s prongs conclude whether all the
elements were satisfied. Similarly, even if the promise is very
clear and the reliance is highly injurious, the court may not
conclude that the injustice is inferred and thus is satisfied.
Rather, the court should further examine the justice element
independently and weigh it against the former two elements.
For example, in Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Company,82 an employer
promised to pay an employee a pension for life upon her
retirement and did pay her the monthly pension for five years.83
80

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., R.S. Bennett & Co. v. Econ. Mech. Indus., Inc., 606 F.2d 182, 186
(7th Cir. 1979); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 683, 698 (Wis. 1965).
82
Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
83
Id. at 164–65.
81
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Subsequently, however, the employer stopped paying and denied
any contractual obligation toward the former employee, claiming
that the payments were gratuitous.84 The employer’s promise for
pension was clear, definite, and unambiguous.85 It was a formal
resolution of the board of directors, which was communicated to
the employee by telephone on the day of the board meeting.86
Likewise, the employee showed detrimental reliance on the
promise.87 She testified that she retired in reliance on the
promised pension.88 As the court stated:
At the time she retired plaintiff was 57 years of age. At the
time the payments were discontinued she was over 63 years of
age. It is a matter of common knowledge that it is virtually
impossible for a woman of that age to find satisfactory
employment, much less a position comparable to that which
plaintiff enjoyed at the time of her retirement.89

In addition, the employee received the pension for several
years and did not seek another employment soon after her
retirement, making her reliance on these payments even more
detrimental.90 Because of the definite and formal promise and
the financial loss caused by the reliance, the justice element need
not be particularly weighty. The court states, for example, that it
does not matter whether the employee was unemployable due to
an illness, her age, or whether the employee became
unemployable before or after the pension payments were
discontinued.91 There are situations in which the denial of the
pension would seem harsher and more unconscionable, and thus
the justice element would be given more weight. However, in
this case, due to the solid promise and reliance, the burden of the
justice element is lighter and the financial loss will do to satisfy
the justice element.

84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Id. at 165, 167.
Id. at 164–65.
Id.
Id. at 166.
Id.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 166, 169.
Id. at 168–69.
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Another example is Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc.92 An
employer made a job offer to Grouse.93 As a result, Grouse
resigned from his job and declined another job offer.94 When he
was ready to start working, after giving his former employer two
weeks’ notice, he was told that someone else had been hired.95 In
this case, the promise, a job offer, was made via telephone to
Grouse and was not as definite as the promise made in
Feinberg.96 Similarly, the financial loss due to the reliance was
less acute in Grouse as compared to Feinberg.97 Though Grouse
had difficulties securing other full-time employment, his wage
loss was not as severe as Feinberg’s pension loss.98 Accordingly,
the injustice element needs to satisfy higher standards in Grouse.
As the court asserts, the employer’s behavior was such that
“[u]nder these circumstances it would be unjust not to hold
Group Health to its promise.”99 The court wished to discourage
such behavior by employers and thus enforced the promise even
though the loss to the employee and the promise were weak.100
Taking into account the power imbalance between the parties,
the justice element weighs in favor of compensating the
promisee.101 Thus, rather than dismissing promissory estoppel
claims because a promise was not clear and definite enough,102
courts should weigh all three factors of the doctrine.
Dickens v. Equifax Services, Inc.,103 discussed in the
Introduction, provides another example in the context of
employment relations. The court concluded that the supervisor’s
assurances did not constitute a clear promise and that the
employee’s reliance on these assurances was unreasonable.104
92

Grouse v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981).
Id. at 115.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 116.
96
At the interview, only company policies, procedures, salaries, and benefits
were discussed and not a concrete job offer. Id. at 115.
97
Grouse, 306 N.W.2d at 116; Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163, 164 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1959).
98
Grouse rejected a job offer based on the offer he received, so apparently he
could have secured another job. Grouse, 306 N.W.2d. at 115.
99
Id. at 116.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
See, e.g., Martens v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 616 N.W.2d 732, 746 (Minn.
2000); Ruud v. Great Plains Supply, Inc., 526 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. 1995).
103
No. 95-1217, 1996 WL 192973 (10th Cir. Apr. 22, 1996).
104
Id. at *6.
93
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One can disagree with this analysis and conclude that the
employee’s reliance was not only reasonable but also detrimental
and caused him, and his wife, substantial loss. And one can
conclude contrary to the court that the supervisor’s assurances
constitute a clear and definite promise. But even if one accepts
that the promise and reliance elements were weak, the court
should not have ignored the justice element. Under the latter
prong, the court should consider the long-term relations between
the parties, the power imbalance between the employer and
employee, the allocative effects of the contract, and public policy
considerations in the context of employment relations. These
considerations not only counterbalance the weakness of the first
two prongs, they also weigh heavily in favor of enforcing the
promise.
Two insurance cases provide other examples for the relation
between the three elements of promissory estoppel. The first
case is Marker v. Preferred Fire Insurance Co.105 Marker
purchased real property, and during the negotiations he agreed
to retain the seller’s insurance policy on the property until the
policy expired.106 Marker informed the insurance company
representative that he was not interested in renewing the
insurance policy, and he would have his father write a new
policy.107 Marker asked the representative to notify him of the
policy’s expiration date, and the representative replied, “I’ll do
that.”108 A tornado hit the property after the insurance policy
had expired.109 Marker sued the insurance company, relying on
promissory estoppel as the basis of contractual obligation and
claiming he relied on the promise to let him know when the
insurance policy expired to his detriment.110 In Marker, the court
rejected the promissory estoppel claim stating:
In the first place there is no evidence whatsoever of any
affirmative inducement or misrepresentation made by Johnson
to Marker.
The circumstances which brought about any
promise of notification from Johnson arose from a rather casual
request by Marker that Johnson should let Marker know the
expiration date of the policy so that Marker could have it
105
106
107
108
109
110

506 P.2d 1163 (Kan. 1973).
Id. at 1166.
Id.
Id. at 1170 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1167.
Id. at 1168.
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renewed. To this request Johnson allegedly responded, ‘I’ll do
that.’ The evidence falls far short of showing that Johnson
intended or expected Marker to rely upon the promise or that
Marker reasonably had the right to rely upon Johnson’s
promise. Furthermore a refusal to enforce the doctrine in this
case would in no way sanction the perpetuation of a fraud or
result in other injustice. It is also clear from the evidence that
from the time the real estate contract was signed, plaintiff
Marker had the original policy in his possession which clearly
disclosed the expiration date. Furthermore another copy of the
policy was mailed to Marker by Johnson after November 5,
1965, when Johnson executed the endorsement to the policy
which added the names of Mr. and Mrs. Marker as additional
named insureds. Johnson could reasonably have assumed that
he was carrying out his promise to notify Marker of the
expiration date of the policy when he mailed a copy of the policy
to Marker. Also we again wish to stress the fact that Marker
was an attorney and was himself a licensed agent for Preferred
Fire Insurance Company. The promise of Johnson to advise
Marker of the expiration date of the policy was a promise wholly
without consideration and essentially was made as a mere
accommodation to Marker. The terms of the policy were always
within the knowledge of the plaintiff and if he failed to
remember that the policy expired at a certain time before the
tornado, it was his own negligence and not that of Johnson
which prevented plaintiff from renewing his policy.111

The second insurance case is Prudential Insurance Co. of
America v. Clark.112 Clark, a marine, purchased a life insurance
policy with no war risk or aviation exclusion clauses after
enlisting.113 An agent of another insurance company persuaded
him to drop his insurance by promising him an equivalent
insurance policy.114 Based on this promise, Clark dropped his
insurance policy and bought the new policy.115 That policy,
however, did include a war risk or aviation exclusion clause.116
After Clark was killed in Vietnam, the insurance company paid
the beneficiaries but later sued them to return the money,

111
112
113
114
115
116

Id. at 1170.
456 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 934.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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claiming it paid the claim through oversight and mistake.117 The
court rejected the insurance company’s suit based on promissory
estoppel.118
The promise of the insurance agent in Clark was affirmative
as compared to the mere “I’ll do that” assurance in Marker. Also,
Marker’s reliance was unreasonable for two reasons. He was a
licensed insurance agent, and he had the insurance policy in his
hands, making him aware of the expiration date.119 In contrast to
Marker, Clark dropped his insurance policy based on the agent’s
promise.120 These differences between the two cases explain their
different results. Clark’s beneficiaries proved both the concrete
promise and detrimental reliance elements of promissory
estoppel.121 Thus, the justice element carried little weight, and
the court accepted their promissory estoppel claim. In contrast,
Marker proved only a weak promise and unreasonable reliance
on his part.122 Therefore, he needed to show very strong justice
considerations in order to enforce the promise. He failed to do so,
and the court rejected his promissory estoppel claim.123 Juliet
Kostritsky argues that while in Clark there was a difference of
status between the professional agent and the layman insured, in
Marker no such power imbalance between the parties exited.124
She concludes that the power imbalance is the reason for the
different outcome in these two cases.125 The above analysis of
Clark and Marker adds to Kostritsky’s explanation. It is not only
the status disparity between the parties, but also the justice
element in conjunction with the other elements of the promissory
estoppel doctrine that distinguish between the cases.126
Another example is the famous Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores,
Inc. case.127 An agent for Red Owl represented on numerous
occasions to the Hoffmans that Red Owl would build a store
building for the Hoffmans to operate in return for their
117

Id. at 935.
Id. at 936.
119
Marker v. Preferred Fire Ins. Co., 506 P.2d 1163, 1171 (Kan. 1973).
120
Clark, 456 F.2d at 936.
121
Id. at 936.
122
Marker, 506 P.2d at 1170–71.
123
Id. at 1170.
124
Kostritsky, supra note 72, at 918.
125
Id.
126
Another difference between the two cases is that while Clark involves loss of
life, Marker involves loss of property.
127
133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
118
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investment of $18,000.128 In reliance upon these representations,
the Hoffmans sold their bakery building and business and their
grocery store and business, they purchased a building site to
operate the store, and they rented a residence for themselves.129
The Hoffmans followed Red Owl’s requests in order for the deal
to go through; however, the negotiations between the parties
were terminated, and Red Owl did not make good on its
representations.130
The court acknowledged that the promise was mainly oral
assurances that were not highly definite.131 Nevertheless, the
court held that under promissory estoppel the promise need not
be as definite as a promise supported by consideration,132 and it
accepted the Hoffmans’ promissory estoppel claim. It is possible
to explain that this is due to the detrimental reliance by the
Hoffmans;133 however, even though the court did not mention the
justice element, it came to the right decision in the context of a
justice analysis as well. The ill treatment of the Hoffmans and
the relations of trust between Red Owl’s representatives and the
Hoffmans lead to such a conclusion.134 Although the promise
element is weak, the justice element tipped the scales in favor of
the Hoffmans. Taking into account the franchise relations as
part of the justice analysis counterbalances the weakness of the
other elements. While the court disregarded the justice element
in its opinion, the above analysis may explain why the court
accepted the promissory estoppel claim in spite of the indefinite
promise.
In some of the cases discussed here, the conclusion under the
justice analysis resembles the conclusion of the court. However,
a meaningful justice element would make a substantive change
in the promissory estoppel doctrine. In some cases, the justice
analysis will result in a different conclusion, and in others the
analysis will give meaningful support for the conclusion. Indeed,
in some cases, even though the court did not explicitly consider
the justice element, it seems that the court was guided by a sense
128

Id. at 274.
Id. at 268–69.
130
Id. at 274–75.
131
Id. at 274.
132
Id.
133
William C. Whitford & Stewart Macaulay, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores: The
Rest of the Story, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 801, 855 (2010).
134
Hoffman, 133 N.W.2d at 275.
129
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of justice in reaching its decision. This Article suggests that
courts affirmatively and explicitly consider justice as an
independent element rather than be guided by a vague sense of
justice.
Furthermore, in order to better understand the
formation process, courts should take into account the relations
between the parties and the power dynamics, the allocative
implications, and other policy considerations. This will make the
court’s analysis more contextualized and lead to just conclusions.
Taking the power imbalance between the parties and their
relations into account along with other public policy and
distribution considerations under the justice element does not
mean a presumption in favor of accepting the promissory
estoppel claim of the underprivileged party. Under such a
presumption, the justice element overshadows the other
elements. However, the courts should consider all of the
doctrines’ elements and should give more weight to the justice
element than they currently do.
C.

From Corrective Justice to Distributive Justice

There is a debate among legal scholars whether private
law,135 in general, and contract law, in particular, should promote
distributive justice considerations.136 Much of the literature
135
The debate as to whether tort law should promote distributive justice is
similar to the debate in contract law. Supporting the view that private law should
promote distributive justice, see, for example, Ken Cooper-Stephenson, Corrective
Justice, Substantive Equality and Tort Law, in TORT THEORY 48, 48 (Ken CooperStephenson & Elaine Gibson eds., 1993); Ken Cooper-Stephenson, Economic
Analysis, Substantive Equality and Tort Law, in TORT THEORY 131, 131 (Ken
Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine Gibson eds., 1993); Ted Decoste, Taking Torts
Progressively, in TORT THEORY 240, 241 (Ken Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine Gibson
eds., 1993); TSACHI KEREN-PAZ, TORTS, EGALITARIANISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
51 (2007); Peter Cane, Distributive Justice and Tort Law, 2001 N.Z. L. REV. 401, 404
(2001); Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of
Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 194–95 (2000); Tsachi Keren-Paz, An Inquiry into
the Merits of Redistribution Through Tort Law: Rejecting the Claim of Randomness,
16 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 91, 91 (2003); see also Dan Priel, Private Law: Commutative or
Distributive?, 77 MOD. L. REV. 308 (2014). But see, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB,
CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 263–64 (2012); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW
210–14 (1995); Alan Schwartz, Products Liability and Judicial Wealth
Redistributions, 51 IND. L.J. 558, 587–89 (1976).
136
Some scholars support the view that contract law should promote
distributive justice. See, e.g., HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS 285–86
(1999); Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Injustice and Private Law, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 105,
147 (2008); Hanoch Dagan, The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice, 98
MICH. L. REV. 138, 139–40 (1999); Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and
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advocating application of distributive justice under contract law
negates the arguments raised against such application.137 Many
scholars who support achieving distributive goals through
contract law do not develop arguments for doing so. Rather, they
challenge the contrary view according to which distributive
justice should not be considered under contract law.138 This
Article takes a different approach. The author’s previous article
demonstrated how promissory estoppel has a disparate impact on
different social groups.139 Specifically, underprivileged promisees
use promissory estoppel to enforce the promises made to them.
Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 624–27 (1943); Christine Jolls, Behavioral
Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1656–57
(1998); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motive in Contract and Tort
Law, with Special References to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power,
41 MD. L. REV. 563, 563 (1982); Josse G. Klijnsma, Contract Law as Fairness, 28
RATIO JURIS 68 (2015); Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Rawls and
Contract Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 598, 600 (2005); Kevin A. Kordana & David H.
Tabachnick, Taxation, the Private Law, and Distributive Justice, 23 SOC. PHIL. &
POL’Y 142, 142 (2006); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice,
89 YALE L.J. 472, 474 (1980); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of
Redistribution Through Private Law, 91 MINN. L. REV. 326, 397 (2006); Eric A.
Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability
Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom To Contract, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 283, 285 (1995); Arthur Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice:
Kant and Rawls, 92 VA. L. REV. 1391, 1395 (2006); Chris William Sanchirico,
Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1008–14
(2001). Other scholars contend that contract law is unsuitable to promote
distributive justice or that other areas of law, such as tax law, are more efficient and
suitable to that end. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 105–07 (1981);
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 100–01 (1993);
Horst Eidenmuller, Party Autonomy, Distributive Justice and the Conclusion of
Contracts in the DCFR, 5 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 109, 119–20 (2009) (“[I]t would have
been better for the DCFR to not even try to achieve distributive purposes by the
means of private law. On the one hand, redistribution by private law is always less
efficient than redistribution by social and tax law, while on the other hand it is
virtually impossible to attain when it comes to contract law.”); Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667 (1994); W.N.R. Lucy, Contract as
a Mechanism of Distributive Justice, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 132, 147 (1989);
William K.S. Wang, Reflections on Contract Law and Distributive Justice: A Reply to
Kronman, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 513, 513–14 (1982). But see Liam B. Murphy, The
Practice of Promise and Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT
LAW 151 (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., 2014).
137
See, e.g., Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Justice and Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 193 (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince
Saprai eds., 2014); Kronman, supra note 136; Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 136, at
396; Posner, supra note 136.
138
Bagchi, supra note 137.
139
Gan, supra note 3, at 56.
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Based on this groups-based analysis, this Article further argues
that distributive justice considerations are warranted under the
analysis of the promissory estoppel doctrine. Rather than
concentrating on why the application of distributive justice in
contract law is not inappropriate, this Article establishes that the
justice element of promissory estoppel should be used as a tool
for applying distributive justice based on the previous article’s
groups-based analysis of the contract formation process.
This Article supports the view that contract law should serve
the goals of distributive justice and not only those of corrective
justice.140
Corrective justice is narrowly concerned with
balancing between the interests of the parties to the contract or
remedying wrongful losses that one party inflicted on the
other.141 Unlike corrective justice, distributive justice takes a
broader view and is concerned with the allocation of wealth,
resources, or entitlements among members of society.142 These
distributive justice goals should be achieved by general contract
law, not only by tax law and regulation in specific areas of law
such as housing and employment. Furthermore, justice means
more than the damage caused to the promisee by her detrimental
reliance on the promise. Rather, justice should include public
policy considerations beyond correcting the imbalance between
the parties. The impact of the promise, the harm caused to the
promisee by the reliance, and the benefit to the promisor are only
some of the relevant considerations. The court should weigh
unjust enrichment and the promisee’s loss alongside other factors
such as power imbalance between the parties, their relations,
and distributive justice considerations.143 Another consideration
140
For distributive justice in contract law see, for example, Bruce Ackerman,
Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing
Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1097 (1971); James
Gordley, Morality and Contract: The Question of Paternalism, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1733, 1737 (2007); Richard S. Markovits, The Distributive Impact, Allocative
Efficiency, and Overall Desirability of Ideal Housing Codes: Some Theoretical
Clarifications, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1815, 1817 (1976); Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and
Justice: The Relation Between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory,
70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 780 (1985); see also Helge Dedek, Duties of Love and SelfPerfection: Moses Mendelssohn’s Theory of Contract, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 713,
716 (2013) (Mendelssohn’s theory of contract is “entirely rooted in altruism and
distributive justice.” (emphasis removed)).
141
Zamir, supra note 38, at 108.
142
Markovits, supra note 140, at 1817.
143
These considerations should be taken into account not only under the
distributive justice analysis but also under relational theory of contract. See, e.g.,
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is to provide a viable avenue for enforcing promises when the
formal requirements of consideration are lacking due to a power
imbalance between the parties. This broad interpretation of
justice is not limited to corrective justice but includes social
aspects of the contract as well. By looking beyond the parties,
contract law gives justice a deeper meaning. The formation of
contract should be addressed not only from the point of view of
the promisor and the promisee, but from a larger social aspect.144
Promissory estoppel is mainly used by certain groups of
promisees—such as employees, family members, general
contractors, insurees, and franchisees—against the more
privileged promisors.145 As promissory estoppel suits are brought
mainly by underprivileged groups’ members, courts should
address these promisees’ needs and the distributive results of
their claims. Thus, in examining the justice element, courts
should take into account power imbalances and the relations
between the parties, members of different groups.
Since
promissory estoppel disparately impacts different social groups,
it should address the distributive effects of the formation process.
Promissory estoppel should be sensitive to the allocative
implications of the contracting process and how formation of
contract has different implications for different social groups.146
This factor will enable the courts to better understand the
contracting process and to empower underprivileged promisees.
Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. L.
REV. 483, 484 (1985).
144
For a theory of relational justice that goes beyond distributive justice, see
Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships (Tel Aviv Univ., Working
Paper, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2463537.
145
Gan, supra note 3, at 80–81.
146
For a different view on justice under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, see
Peter Linzer, Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and Reliance, Contracts and
Torts, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 695, 759–60 (2001) (“The traditional rules of restitution and
promissory estoppel work when the facts fit, that is, when there is a clear unjust
enrichment or a clear promise clearly relied upon. The problem is how to decide if an
obligation exists when there is not a negotiated and well-drafted contract, nor an
explicit promise that was foreseeably relied upon nor a clearly unjust act that
enriched the defendant at the plaintiff’s expense. I think that the best we can hope
for is some amount of rough justice. That a claim doesn’t fit the rules of promissory
estoppel or the rules of restitution should not end the matter, though it may make us
ask that the plaintiff show us something else. I would start by looking at the
relationship between the parties. Of course everything is a relationship; the word is
not magic. Relationships can be good or bad—or some of both. They can be very
formal. They can be paternalistic. They can be exploitative. And they can be
indifferent, a relationship where there is no relationship.”).
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Not taking this factor into account has distributional effects: It
maintains the status quo and sustains the current allocation. As
is demonstrated in the examples that follow, there are different
kinds of power imbalance and relations dynamics. There are
differences between employer-employee, franchisor-franchisee,
insurance company-insuree, general contractor-subcontractors,
and husband-wife relationships to name just a few examples.
Thus, the court should engage in a nuanced analysis of the
relationship between the parties.
Many promissory estoppel cases are brought in the
employment context and provide good examples of typical
promissory estoppel cases described above. These cases deal
with two social groups and the power imbalance between them.
Both denied pension cases and denied job offer cases demonstrate
the power dynamics between employers and employees in
negotiations. The former misuse their powerful position to make
a promise and then deny that promise after benefiting from it.
When the promisees cannot enforce the promise based on breach
of contract, promissory estoppel is their only claim for enforcing
the broken promise. Looking not only at the parties but beyond
them to the employer-employee relations, then, promissory
estoppel is an important tool to empower employees. This
redistributive goal is to enforce the promises made to
employees.147
Feinberg,148 a denied pension case, and Grouse,149 a denied
job offer case, discussed earlier, provide two examples. In the
former, the court should have considered the long-term work
relations between the parties150 and the way employers treat
elderly people as they retire from work. In the latter, the court
should have considered the ill treatment of employment
candidates.151 In such cases, the court should examine whether
147
Hillman, supra note 15, at 27. For justice in the employment context, see also
Larry A. DiMatteo et al., Justice, Employment, and the Psychological Contract, 90
OR. L. REV. 449, 484–85, 509–10 (2011); Martin H. Malin, The Distributive and
Corrective Justice Concerns in the Debate over Employment At-Will: Some
Preliminary Thoughts, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 117, 119–21 (1992).
148
Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959). For a similar
case, see also Katz v. Danny Dare, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
149
Grouse v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981).
150
Feinberg worked in the company from 1910 to 1949. Feinberg, 322 S.W.2d at
164–66. She received the pension until 1956. Id. at 166.
151
Grouse was made a job offer not in accordance with company’s policy that
required a written recommendation which Grouse did not provide. The interviewer
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employers misuse their power advantage over the employees, and
prospective or former employees. They should also disallow
employers to make promises to employees and then deny the
promises to the detriment of the employee. Dickens,152 discussed
in the Introduction, provides another example. In that case, the
relations between the employer and employee and the power
imbalance were relevant considerations under the justice
element. The court should have considered whether to allow an
employer to misuse his power over the employee, offer the
employee relocation and encourage the employee to radically
change his position, and then deny such an offer after benefiting
from the employee’s move. Unfortunately, the court ignored the
justice element.
In another employment case, the court declared:
In the present case, to the extent that Suehisa’s statements
could be construed as promising Gonsalves that he would retain
his job regardless of the findings of the investigation, we hold
that they are unenforceable as a matter of public policy. An
interpretation by Gonsalves that would ensure his continued
employment, despite findings that he sexually harassed others
in his workplace, would be to either absolve Nissan of its
obligations to take immediate and appropriate action to prevent
sexual harassment or to hinder Nissan in its fulfillment of its
obligations. To enforce Suehisa’s “promises” after a finding of
sexual harassment would be offensive to public policy. Thus, we
hold that, in the present case, to the extent that promises were
made to Gonsalves that he would retain his job regardless of the
outcome of the investigation, those promises were
unenforceable, and Gonsalves is unable to maintain a claim for
promissory estoppel as a matter of public policy.153

The court’s decision is based on public policy considerations
outside the promissory estoppel doctrine. What the court should
have done was consider under the justice element of promissory
estoppel the consequences of enforcing such a promise to an
employee. Promising an employee that he can keep his job in
called Grouse to make sure he quit his position but did not call him to let him know
that the position was filled by someone else. Only when Grouse called to report that
he was free to begin working was he told that someone else was hired. When Grouse
complained, he got an apology, but no further actions were taken. Grouse, 306
N.W.2d at 116.
152
Dickens v. Equifax Servs., Inc., No. 951217, 1996 WL 192973 (10th Cir. Apr.
22, 1996).
153
Gonsalves v. Nissan Motor Corp., 58 P.3d 1196, 1213 (Haw. 2002).
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spite of a complaint of sexual harassment is unjust. It will have
a damaging effect on work relations and will work against the
goal of eradicating sexual harassment in the workplace. Looking
at employer-employee relations and work relations at large, with
an emphasis on a problem of sexual harassment in the
employment context, is part of justice considerations. These
considerations reach beyond the specific parties in this case.
Sexual harassment is a result of power relations in the
employment setting.154 Under the justice element of promissory
estoppel,
the
court
should
include
examination
of
employer-employee relations dynamics.
Another employment case involves the relations between a
union and management.155 The employees argued that they
made wage and benefit concessions in order to modernize the
plant and keep it open.156 After the plant was closed, the
The court rejected their
employees sued the employer.157
promissory estoppel claim because the employer’s officials’ oral
statements did not constitute a promise.158 However, the court
disregarded the justice element. The court should have policed
the way the company conducted its business at the expense of the
employees and work relations at large.159 The court viewed the
corporation as an owner that had discretion to close the plant.160
The court did not consider the context of the long-term relations
between the employees and employer, and the financial behavior
of the corporation to the detriment of its employees. This larger
picture should inform the court to better understand the facts.
Taking into account this background complicates the owner’s
discretionary rationale to the court.
A similar example involves a case dealing with the relations
between farmers and the banks that loan them money.161 In
State Bank of Standish v. Curry,162 the Currys, dairy farmers,

154
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 1 (1979).
155
Abbington v. Dayton Malleable, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 1290, 1292–95 (S.D. Ohio
1983).
156
Id. at 1296.
157
Id. at 1295.
158
Id. at 1297.
159
AMY KASTELY ET AL., CONTRACTING LAW 312–16 (4th ed. 2006).
160
Id.
161
See generally State Bank of Standish v. Curry, 500 N.W.2d 104 (Mich. 1993).
162
500 N.W.2d 104.

FINAL_GAN

90

10/16/2015 2:49 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:55

argued that the bank promised to make them a loan, on which
they relied, and the bank argued that assurances were not made
in the context of a specific loan.163 When the bank denied the
loan, the farmers sued, and the court accepted the farmers’
promissory estoppel claim.164 The court based its decision on the
promise made by the bank165 and on the Currys’ reliance on that
promise166 and disregarded the justice element.167 The court did
not consider generally the long-term relations between the
farmers and the bank,168 the trust between the parties, the power
dynamics between the parties, and the dependency of the
farmers on the banks.169
The Currys’ loan is set in the
background of power dynamics between the bank and its
customers and the farming industry’s economics.170 This context
should be addressed under the justice element to enable the court
to better understand the situation and to consider the
distributive implications of its decision on the larger society,
here, the farming industry.171
163

Id. at 106–07.
Id. at 111.
165
Id. The bank officer stated that since “the Currys were doing a good
job[,] . . . the bank would support them.” Id. at 106. The Currys received loans from
the bank for many years. Id.
166
Based on the bank’s promise to make the loan, the Currys did not submit a
bid in the government’s dairy buy-out program. Id.
167
Id. at 113 n.4 (Riley, J., dissenting) (“The essential justification for the
doctrine of promissory estoppel is the avoidance of substantial hardship or injustice
were the promise not to be enforced. Too liberal an application of the concept will
result in an unwitting and unintended undermining of the traditional rule requiring
consideration for a contract. This is particularly true where the promise is the loan
of money. Such promises, even when unsupported by consideration, do induce
borrowers to neglect to secure the needed money elsewhere, and lenders must be
held to anticipate such conduct. To hold as enforceable, however, a voluntary
promise of a loan made to one who, in reliance thereon, fails to exercise a valueless
right to seek the money elsewhere, would be tantamount to rendering all such
voluntary promises of a loan enforceable without consideration. A determination
declaring such a deviation from presently accepted contract principles should only
come from a confrontation with that issue, and not as an unintended consequence of
the loose application of promissory estoppel to promises to lend money.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
168
The Currys obtained yearly loans from the bank since 1975 and until 1986,
when they were refused the loan, the subject of this case. Id. at 105.
169
KASTELY, supra note 159, at 290.
170
See generally State Bank of Standish, 500 N.W.2d 104.
171
For other similar promissory estoppel cases involving relations between
creditor and debtor see, for example, Aceves v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d
507 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); Garcia v. World Sav., FSB, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 683 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2010); see also Amy B. Parker, Mending Broken Promises: Allowing
164
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Another interesting case, Ypsilanti v. General Motors
Corp.,172 concerns a situation in which a corporation decided to
close a plant after it received tax abatement from the town.173
The question was whether a promise was made by the
corporation to keep the plant’s production and keep creating jobs
for the town’s employees on which the town reasonably relied and
gave the corporation the tax abatement.174 In one case, the trial
court accepted the town’s promissory estoppel claim and held
that the corporation is bound by its promise and is enjoined from
transferring the production from the plant to another facility.175
On appeal, however, the court reversed and rejected the
promissory estoppel claim.176 While the trial court found a clear
promise on which the town reasonably relied, the court of appeals
held that these elements were not satisfied.177
However,
interestingly, while the court of appeals disregarded the justice
element of promissory estoppel and only addressed General
Motors’ promise and the people of Ypsilanti’s reasonable reliance
on that promise, the trial court gave the justice element
considerable weight.178 The trial court held:
This Court . . . simply finds that the failure to act in this case
would result in a terrible injustice and that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel should be applied. Each judge who dons
this robe assumes the awesome, and lonely, responsibility to
make decisions about justice, and injustice, which will
dramatically affect the way people are forced to live their lives.
Every such decision must be the judge’s own and it must be
made honestly and in good conscience. There would be a gross
inequity and patent unfairness if General Motors, having lulled
the people of the Ypsilanti area into giving up millions of tax
dollars which they so desperately need to educate their children
and provide basic governmental services, is allowed to simply

Homeowners To Pursue Claims of Promissory Estoppel Against Lenders When
Denied Loan Modifications, 47 NEW ENG. L. REV. 985 (2013).
172
No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL 132385, at *1 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1993), rev’d,
506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
173
See, e.g., id.; Charter Twp. of Ypsilanti v. Gen. Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d
556, 557–58 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
174
Ypsilanti, 506 N.W.2d at 558.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 562. The Michigan Supreme Court refused to hear the case. Charter
Twp. of Ypsilanti v. Gen. Motors Corp., 509 N.W.2d 152 (Mich. 1993).
177
Id. at 559.
178
Ypsilanti, 1993 WL 132385, at *13.
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decide that it will desert 4500 workers and their families
because it thinks it can make these same cars a little cheaper
somewhere else. Perhaps another judge in another court would
not feel moved by that injustice and would labor to find a legal
rationalization to allow such conduct. But in this Court it is my
responsibility to make that decision. My conscience will not
allow this injustice to happen.179

Contrary to the court of appeals, the trial court gave the
justice element a broad meaning.180 It considered the long-term
relations between the parties181 and the financial consequences to
the town if the plant were closed.182 It looked beyond the parties
to the larger economic and social context.183 This difference in
the two courts’ approaches to the justice element of promissory
estoppel also explains the different results they reached.
Unfortunately, unlike the trial court, the court of appeals did not
use justice as a guide in making its decision.184
Clark185 and Marker,186 discussed above, provide other
examples. Both cases involve relations between an insurance
company and an insured.187 As Kostritsky argues, the power
dynamics between the parties are relevant factors in the courts’
179

Id. at *13.
See id.
181
General Motors operated the two plants in Ypsilanti from 1975 through 1990
and received eleven tax abatements of over 1.3 billion dollars. Id. at *4.
182
Consideration of the relation between the town of Ypsilanti and General
Motors is apparent also in the trial court’s analysis of the promise—the many
meetings between General Motors’ representatives and the town’s officials—and
reliance—the many years of tax abatements worth millions of dollars.
183
For an analysis of this case taking into account this special context, see
Adam Michael Lett, Note, Tax Abatements and Promissory Estoppel: A Match Not
Made in Ypsilanti, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1301 (1995); Joshua P. Rubin, Note, Take the
Money and Stay: Industrial Location Incentives and Relational Contracting, 70
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1277 (1995); David L. Gregory, Company Closings and Community
Consequences, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1 (1994); see also DON MONTIE, MORE OF
BEEN THERE (2012).
184
For a different opinion, see Halle Fine Terrion, Comment, Charter Township
of Ypsilanti v. General Motors: The Politics of Promissory Estoppel Run Amok, 43
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1475 (1993). For other similar promissory estoppel cases
involving relations between the plant and the corporation, see, for example, Local
1330, United Steel Workers v. U.S. Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980); see
also Harris Freeman, The First of Thousands? The Long View of Local 1330’s
Challenge to Management Rights and Plant Closings, 7 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL
LEFT 55 (2011).
185
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Clark, 456 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1972).
186
Marker v. Preferred Fire Ins. Co., 506 P.2d 1163 (Kan. 1973).
187
For another similar promissory estoppel case involving insurance, see, for
example, Green v. Helmcamp Ins. Agency, 499 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
180
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analyses though the courts did not consider explicitly the justice
element of promissory estoppel.188 The relations between the
parties and the imbalance of power between them is part of the
justice element and is a consideration for or against enforcing the
promise.
Another example involves franchisee-franchisor relations. In
Red Owl, the classic promissory estoppel case discussed above,
the court disregarded the justice element.189 The court should
have addressed the relational character of the contract.190 This
context relates to the incompleteness and indefinite nature of the
promise of the franchisor.191 But, more generally, this context
also relates to the franchise relationship itself and its allocative
aspects. In such cases, the court should take into account this
consideration rather than be guided by a vague sense of justice.
One example of taking into account public policy
considerations beyond the parties under the justice prong of
promissory estoppel is the issue of a promise of confidentiality to
news sources under the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. In such cases, the courts consider how enforcing
the promise of anonymity will affect freedom of the press. In the
leading case, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,192 the court concluded:
188

Kostritsky, supra note 72, at 918.
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 275 (Wis. 1965) (“We
conclude that injustice would result here if plaintiffs were not granted some relief
because of the failure of defendants to keep their promises which induced plaintiffs
to act to their detriment.”).
190
Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of
Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 928 (1990).
191
Id. at 979.
192
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992). For the history of
this case, see Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990); Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). For an analysis of this
case, see, for example, Jerome A. Barron, Cohen v. Cowles Media and Its
Significance for First Amendment Law and Journalism, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
419 (1994); Alan E. Garfield, The Mischief of Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 35 GA. L.
REV. 1087 (2001); Kyu Ho Youm & Harry W. Stonecipher, The Legal Bounds of
Confidentiality Promises: Promissory Estoppel and the First Amendment, 45 FED.
COMM. L.J. 63 (1992); Joseph H. Kaufman, Comment, Beyond Cohen v Cowles Media
Co.: Confidentiality Agreements and Efficiency Within the “Marketplace of Ideas”,
1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 255 (1993); Daniel A. Levin & Ellen Blumberg Rubert,
Promises of Confidentiality to News Sources After Cohen v. Cowles Media Company:
A Survey of Newspaper Editors, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 423 (1994); Joseph W.
Ragusa, Comment, Biting the Hand That Feeds You: The Reporter-Confidential
Source Relationship in the Wake of Cohen v. Cowles Media Company, 67 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 125 (1993); Carl Werner, Note, Collision Without Injury: Three Years After
Cohen, Contract Principles and Freedom of the Press Co-Exist Nicely, 30 HOUS. L.
189
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The newspapers argue it is unjust to be penalized for publishing
the whole truth, but it is not clear this would result in an
injustice in this case. For example, it would seem veiling
Cohen’s identity by publishing the source as someone close to
the opposing gubernatorial ticket would have sufficed as a
sufficient reporting of the “whole truth.” Cohen, on the other
hand, argues that it would be unjust for the law to countenance,
at least in this instance, the breaking of a promise. We agree
that denying Cohen any recourse would be unjust. What is
significant in this case is that the record shows the defendant
newspapers themselves believed that they generally must keep
promises of confidentiality given a news source. The reporters
who actually gave the promises adamantly testified that their
promises should have been honored.
The editors who
countermanded the promises conceded that never before or
since have they reneged on a promise of confidentiality. . . . It
was this long-standing journalistic tradition that Cohen, who
has worked in journalism, relied upon in asking for and
receiving a promise of anonymity. Neither side in this case
clearly holds the higher moral ground, but in view of the
defendants’ concurrence in the importance of honoring promises
of confidentiality, and absent the showing of any compelling
need in this case to break that promise, we conclude that the
resultant harm to Cohen requires a remedy here to avoid an
injustice. In short, defendants are liable in damages to plaintiff
for their broken promise.193

In these cases, the courts looked beyond the parties to the
contract and took into account considerations of freedom of
speech, the relations between the reporters and the source, the
ability of the journalists to truthfully report the news, and the
right of the public to receive the full information.194 These public
policy considerations, and not merely correcting the equilibrium
between the parties, were at the center of the cases.195
Furthermore, these public policy considerations were addressed

REV. 2085 (1994); Gregory F. Monday, Note, Cohen v. Cowles Media Is Not a
Promising Decision, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1243 (1992). For more promissory estoppel
cases enforcing promises by the media, see, for example, Ruzicka v. Conde Nast
Publ’ns, 999 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1993).
193
Cohen, 479 N.W.2d at 391–92.
194
See generally id.
195
See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668–72 (1991).
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under the justice element of promissory estoppel, as opposed to
yielding the result to public policy considerations outside the
scope of the promissory estoppel doctrine.196
Unconscionability doctrine serves distributive justice
goals.197 Thus, policing the allocative aspects of the formation
process using both promissory estoppel and unconscionability
doctrine will harmonize contract law.
There are different theories of distributive justice.198 In spite
of these differences, choosing one theory of distributive justice to
be applied under the promissory estoppel doctrine is beyond the
scope of this Article. As this doctrine is concerned with different
social groups that interact with one another,199 there is a need to
take this background into account, under any theory of
distributive justice.
D. The Remedy
Courts should have broad discretion to award the remedy
that justice requires. The courts should have full range of
contractual remedies to choose from to tailor to the specific case
before them. Most times, courts would probably award either
expectation damages or reliance damages, but the remedies
should not be so confined. A court may award the promisee the
value of the promised performance or the losses she suffered as a
result of her change in position. But in some cases, restitution,
specific performance,200 or prejudgment interest,201 for example,
might be a more adequate remedy. In Ypsilanti, discussed above,
specific performance, rather than damages, was the appropriate

196

Cohen, 479 N.W.2d at 391–92.
Bagchi, supra note 137, at 135.
198
See, e.g., SAMUEL FLEISCHACKER, A SHORT HISTORY OF DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE (2004); JOHN E. ROEMER, THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (1996).
199
Gan, supra note 3, at 100.
200
For cases involving promises to convey land where specific performance was
awarded under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, see, for example, Mazer v.
Jackson Ins. Agency, 340 So. 2d 770, 772–73 (Ala. 1976); Christy v. Hoke, 618 P.2d
1095, 1096 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Elgin Nat’l Indus. v. Howard Indus., 264 So. 2d
440, 441 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Johnson v. Pattison, 185 N.W.2d 790, 795, 797–
98 (Iowa 1971); Cellucci v. Sun Oil Co., 320 N.E.2d 919, 921, 926–27 (Mass. App. Ct.
1974), aff’d, 331 N.E.2d 813 (Mass. 1975); Lear v. Bishop, 476 P.2d 18, 22 (Nev.
1970); see also Skebba v. Kasch, 724 N.W.2d 408 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (awarding
specific performance in the employment context).
201
See, e.g., Remes v. Nordic Grp., 726 A.2d 77, 78 (Vt. 1999).
197
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remedy.202 The equitable nature of promissory estoppel supports
this discretion and flexibility in remedies.203 As opposed to the
formal bargained-for rules, this doctrine should be more
open-ended and award the appropriate remedy in each case.
The result of the above analysis will be a harmonious
promissory estoppel—opening the justice element to a broader
set of considerations alongside wide discretion in awarding
remedies. Not only will the court take into account many
different factors, such as how the parties are relatively situated
as well as social factors and public policy, the court will also
tailor the remedy to the specific situation. Like the justice
element of promissory estoppel, the remedy should also be
applied broadly.
E.

Why Is Justice Important?

Promissory estoppel is an important doctrine for
subordinated social groups. For example, Neil G. Williams has
argued that parties who breach a promise to marry, usually men,
should be liable for damages under promissory estoppel.204 These
reliance damages would compensate the promisee, usually a
woman, for the economic harm she suffered without the
stereotypes associated with the breach of promise to marry
suit.205 Gillian K. Hadfield provides another example. She
argues that promissory estoppel offers an alternative logic that
would help solve the “dilemma of choice.”206 This dilemma is “the
202
Indeed, the trial court that accepted the promissory estoppel claim ordered
that GMC is enjoined from transferring the production from the plant to another
facility. Charter Twp. of Ypsilanti v. Gen. Motors Corp, No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL
132385, at *13–14. (Mich. Cir. Ct., Feb. 9, 1993), rev’d, 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993).
203
Holmes, supra note 32, at 516 (“The remedy for breach is discretionary and
personalized, predicated on the principles and standards of good faith, conscience,
honesty, and equity. A promisee or third party recovering under promissory estoppel
should neither be penalized nor experience a windfall. Equitable promissory estoppel
empowers courts to fashion a personalized remedy from the full range of remedies.
Courts can award expectation, reliance, restitution, specific performance, exemplary,
injunctive, or other appropriate relief to fit the crime and achieve corrective justice
between the parties.”).
204
Neil G. Williams, What To Do When There’s No “I Do”: A Model for Awarding
Damages Under Promissory Estoppel, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1021–22 (1995).
205
Id. at 1022–23.
206
See Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist
Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 1235, 1249–50 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see Debora L.
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conflict between promoting women’s autonomy and freedom of
choice on the one hand, and protecting women from the harmful
consequences of choices made under conditions of inequality on
the other.”207 In other words, the tension is between freedom of
contract on the one hand and paternalism on the other.208 This
Article supports the view that promissory estoppel is an
important doctrine for underprivileged social groups but by using
a different approach and for different reasons.
In a recent article, the author argues that promissory
estoppel is an important doctrine because it strengthens the right
of disadvantaged parties to contract.209
Many promissory
estoppel cases are situations in which the promisees cannot prove
a breach of contract claim because they fail to meet the
formalities of the consideration doctrine. Thus, promissory
estoppel is their only way to enforce the promise made to them.
Because of this function, promissory estoppel then raises issues
of participation in benefitting from and access to contract. In
other words, it involves the issue of the inclusiveness of contract
law. This article is theoretical and argues for the importance of
promissory estoppel due to this important role it plays. More
generally, it calls for a more inclusive contract law that is
sensitive and open to the inclusion of disadvantaged social
groups.
Patricia J. Williams argues that rights discourse, both rights
in general and also specifically the right to contract, is important
for blacks and minorities.210 While Williams addresses the
importance of rights generally, the author’s previous article
focuses on promissory estoppel.211 Furthermore, in her critique of
Critical Legal Studies, Williams stresses the importance of
formality of rights to empower the underprivileged. While this
author maintains that although promissory estoppel is a flexible

Threedy, Dancing Around Gender: Lessons from Arthur Murray on Gender and
Contracts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 749, 773–75 (2010).
207
Hadfield, supra note 206, at 1238.
208
Id.
209
Gan, supra note 3, at 52.
210
Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from
Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 406–08 (1987). “One
consequence of this broader reconfiguration of rights, again in the context of
contract, is to give voice to those people or things which, by virtue of their object
relation to the contract, historically had no voice.” Id. at 425–26.
211
Gan, supra note 3, at 52.
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doctrine and an alternative to the formal doctrine of
consideration, it strengthens the right of underprivileged parties
to contract. The Article, then, stresses the importance of the
doctrine of promissory estoppel in providing disadvantaged
parties an avenue to enforce promises, to participate in and
benefit from contracts, to be included in the realm of contract,
and to have a meaningful right to contract.212
This Article is a follow-up article. The aim of this Article is
to show how promissory estoppel can become a more important
doctrine and to better serve its role by giving the justice element
a more robust meaning. This Article puts the theoretical
suggestion into practice and indicates one way to make
promissory estoppel a more meaningful doctrine—by giving
justice a broader and weightier interpretation. Furthermore, the
previous article identified that promissory estoppel is especially
important to certain groups of promisees, such as employees,
which are typically the weaker party. Hence, coloring section 90
in distributive justice colors will empower these promisees. The
previous article advocated using promissory estoppel to achieve
allocative justice in the formation process.213 This Article shows
how such a goal can be achieved by a rigorous application of the
justice element based on a theory of distributive justice.
Surely other changes can be made in the promissory estoppel
doctrine to strengthen it. For example, courts demand a high
threshold of proof to prove each element of the doctrine.214 Thus,
one might argue that lowering this burden of proof will do.
However, rather than changing the current analysis of the
promise or the reliance elements of promissory estoppel,
changing the justice element has some advantages. First, unlike
the other elements of promissory estoppel, the justice element is
currently underdeveloped. Second, strengthening the justice
element will strengthen the equitable nature of promissory
estoppel.
Third, an elaborated justice element will make
promissory estoppel more flexible and a viable alternative to the
formal and rigid doctrine of consideration.215 As a result, the
212

Id.
Id.
214
Hillman, supra note 15, at 24; see also Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Cedar Rapids &
Iowa City Ry. Co., 477 F. Supp. 2d 980, 999 (N.D. Iowa 2007) (“ ‘Strict proof’ is
required for all of the elements of [a promissory estoppel] claim . . . .”).
215
For promissory estoppel as a viable alternative to formal formation rules, see
Hadfield, supra note 206.
213
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formation process will be less formal and more conscionable. The
contracting process will also be more egalitarian by using the
justice element to balance the power difference between the
parties. Fourth, a broader justice element will result in a more
effective enforcement of promises.
It will strengthen the
promissory estoppel doctrine to the benefit of unprivileged
promisees. The reliance interest of parties will be better
protected and more promises will be enforced to the advantage of
promisees who cannot meet the demands of the doctrine of
consideration but nevertheless have compelling cases to enforce
the promises made to them. Last, contract law will be more
harmonious in promoting distributive justice through both
promissory estoppel and unconscionability.
A significant justice element will, then, make promissory
estoppel a more meaningful doctrine of contract formation. This
will result in a more flexible, egalitarian, and conscionable
contracting process. And more generally, this will result in a
more inclusive and pluralist contract law. This will benefit first
and foremost the underprivileged parties. But this is desirable
also to parties generally, including dominant parties. It might be
that in the short run, privileged parties profit from denying their
promises after benefiting from the promisee’s behavior.
However, in the long term, all parties, including privileged
parties, will benefit from promoting trust and cooperation
between the parties,216 from protecting the reliance interest,217

216
For the importance of promissory estoppel in promoting trust and
cooperation, see, for example, John J. Chung, Promissory Estoppel and the Protection
of Interpersonal Trust, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 37, 38 (2008); Daniel A. Farber & John
H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the “Invisible
Handshake,” 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 905 (1985); Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and
Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 823 (1941); Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips,
The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35
RUTGERS L. REV. 472, 506 (1983); see also David A. Hoffman & Tess WilkinsonRyan, The Psychology of Contract Precautions, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 395, 438–40 (2013);
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach Is for Suckers, 63 VAND. L. REV.
1003, 1039–40 (2010).
217
For the reliance interest in contract law, see generally L. L. Fuller & William
R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936);
Victor P. Goldberg, Protecting Reliance, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1033 (2014). For
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and from including in contract law parties who have been
excluded from it in the past.218
CONCLUSION
This Article advocates for a change in promissory estoppel
doctrine. It argues that enforcing promises under this doctrine
should not be limited to avoiding injustice, but rather courts
should actively promote justice. It further claims that justice
should be an independent and significant element of promissory
estoppel based on a theory of distributive justice. Though
applying distributive justice to contract law doctrines is not a
novel concept, current promissory estoppel case law and
literature are mainly based on corrective justice theory. This
robust justice element will make promissory estoppel a more
important doctrine—a viable and meaningful alternative to the
doctrine of consideration. As a result, the contracting process
will be more flexible and sensitive to distribution and public
policy issues; the power imbalance in negotiations will be policed;
the reliance interest of parties will be better protected; and
underprivileged parties will be empowered and they will be
better able to use and enjoy their right to contract.
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